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(January 28, 2013)

Today, Sterling Analytics has taken the first step in delivering legal fee advisory services to individuals who are overwhelmed with the issues involving spiraling legal costs in a divorce.

Controlling Divorce Costs is a completely new approach that Sterling Analytics developed to help individuals control legal fees for individuals:

ControllingDivorceCosts.com is a website that:

1. Gives individuals free information regarding how they can take action to control the legal fees and costs of a typical divorce; and
2. Allows them an opportunity to obtain low cost consultation with an attorney trained to advise individuals on such topics as:

• proper billing methods;
• client-friendly retainer agreements;
• standards for proper vs. improper expenses; and
• attorneys’ ethical responsibility for the efficient conduct of litigation

We are excited about this new approach.

Take a look: controllingdivorcecosts.com

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(Volume 2, Issue 34)

In a recent case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio rejected a $5,100 stipulation for attorney’s fees in an Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) case and instead awarded only $2,088.50 in fees because of the attorney’s questionable behavior and questionable billing practices. The court’s focus in this case was mostly directed at an attorney whose fee from generating the fee application itself represented 47.5%, or $2,808.20, of the overall fee requested.

First, the court evaluated the number of hours expended by the attorney on the case. Of the 17.1 hours billed, 15.2 of them were spent researching and drafting the request for attorney’s fees. At a hearing the court inquired whether the work was new or if any work had been taken from previous cases. The court ultimately discovered that nearly 65% of the fee application was directly copied and pasted verbatim from prior filings and a majority of the arguments revolved around the issue of counsel’s hourly rate under the EAJA. The court also researched previous filings and discovered that 96.8% of the attorney’s argument revolved around his hourly rate, and that the argument was not new or novel. The court also found the attorney’s behavior ethically questionable because he claimed to the court that a stipulation with opposing counsel was not achievable, when in reality, the Commissioner did enter into a stipulation for fees. Plaintiff’s attorney failed to follow up and billed for the application for fees instead. As a result, the court reduced the attorney’s hours from 17.1 hours to 1.9 hours for the actual substantive work that was performed in the case.

Next the court evaluated the reasonable hourly rate, which in an EAJA action is $125 per hour, unless a cost of living adjustment or special factor showing is made. Plaintiff sought an increase in their fees based upon inflation. However, the court decided not to exercise discretion to grant this request in order to send a message to the attorney about his behavior and billing practices. The court found it unreasonable that counsel attempted to spend government money by billing for the same work repeatedly and attempting to deceive the court when asked how much of the work was recycled from previous filings.

Implications for Legal Billing: This case highlights that courts will not rubber stamp a stipulation for fees merely because the parties agree. A court will often dissect and research the fees requested, especially when they are not proportional to the underlying award of fees sought in the case.

If a court finds work unnecessary, duplicative, or otherwise questionable, an attorney may pay the price in his or her compensation.

* English v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124085 (N.D. Ohio). Full copies of court decisions may be available through counsel or through various Internet links or paid services.

By Lisa Belrose

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(Volume 2, Issue 33)

In June 2012 the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted an award of $62,836 in attorney fees, $538,782.50 less than the amount initially requested. The court reduced the award based on an unreasonable rate charged by the attorney, time billed for work done on unrelated/unsuccessful claims, as well as excessive billing, vague entries, and a minimal award recovery on the claims.

First, the court analyzed the “prevailing market rate factors” to determine the reasonable hourly rate. The court noted, that the rate is “calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel.” The burden is on the fee applicant to submit evidence along with affidavits from the attorney to support the hourly rate.  The court found that the plaintiff submitted no evidence concerning the “rate for attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation” and found the fee applicant relied specifically on the exact rate used in a prior case. The court indicated that fee applicants should rely on the same standards for fee recovery set forth in similar cases, not exact rates. The court reduced the plaintiff’s hourly rate from $425 to $315.  They based their analysis on a fee rewarded in recent similar litigation along with the plaintiffs overall experience, experience litigating matters similar to the case, and the complexity of the issues.

Next, the court determined the fee request included time spent on claims unrelated to the plaintiff’s successful claim against the defendant. The court indicated, “time spent on unsuccessful or unrelated claims may be excluded from the lodestar calculation.” Since the plaintiff failed to distinguish between time spent on the successful claim against the defendant and time spent on other claims brought in the same litigation, the court deferred to the trial record. Upon review of the record, the Court found only 1/3 of the initial trial, discovery, and pretrial motion practice was dedicated to plaintiff’s successful claim and subsequently reduced the claimed hours by approximately 67%. Of the remaining hours (1/3 of the initial total) the court further reduced the hours by 75% as the plaintiff was successful on only one of four claims brought against the defendant. The court also found a duplication of effort for work performed on the second trial which provided further support for the reduction.

Finally, the court found that excessive billing and inadequate documentation justified a further reduction of hours. The plaintiff’s time log contained overbilling for numerous tasks including more than 8 hours spent on a 4 page ex parte application and 162 hours spent on the motion for fees. Furthermore, the time log included numerous vague entries including a failure to describe research performed.  The court also instituted a $25,000 reduction in legal fees based on the minimal recovery in the action.

Implications for Legal Billing: This case reinforces the importance of providing evidence along with affidavits to support hourly rates charged. In the current case a reduction of $90 per hour was applied for failure to provide evidence of attorney experience, experience litigating similar matters, as well as complexity of the issues.

Failing to delineate time spent on successful versus unsuccessful claims or time spent on claims unrelated to the action can also lead to a significant decrease in the fee award. When the fee applicant fails to partition the claims, the court can rely on the trial record to determine the percentage of time spent on each claim and reduce the award accordingly. Multiple trials on the same issue can also result in a reduction if a duplication of effort is found.

Finally this case illustrates the importance of billing judgment. Excessive time spent on tasks and vague billing entries can result in a reduction of fees.

* Dubose v. County of Los Angeles, 2012 WL 2135293 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Full copies of court decisions may be available through counsel or through various Internet links or paid services.

By Keith Langlais

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(Volume 2, Issue 32)

In June 2012 the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, reduced an attorney fee award from $2,811,304.50 to $2,218,671.60 which included a $37,965 reduction for overhead charges followed by a 20% reduction of the remaining award. The court based the 20% reduction on the defense counsel’s use of block billing as the court was unable to identify specific time increments spent on each task. Contributing to the 20% reduction were entries of imprecise billing, discrete unsuccessful litigation strategies, overstaffing, and lack of support for hourly rates. The court chose to lower the award by 20%, as an hour by hour review of fee records was “impractical and a waste of judicial resources.”

First, the court reduced the award by $37,965 for overhead charges included on the fee ledger. Clerical and administrative work performed by “legal specialists” (employees not considered attorneys or paralegals) is considered overhead and cannot be included in the fee ledger. Moreover, the court identified numerous occasions in which an attorney or paralegal billed for clerical tasks, including a charge by an attorney for transportation of documents to the courthouse.

Next the court found that every one of defense counsel’s time sheets, which included hundreds of pages of bills and thousands of billing entries, included block billed entries. Furthermore, the court determined many of the entries were vague and imprecise, such as “Deposition preparation; strategy; review file; meeting with expert; meeting with client.” The defense counsel consistently used the same description for billing entries, including a single description used for 33 distinct and “nearly consecutive entries.”

Third, the court identified numerous unsuccessful litigation strategies pursued by the defense counsel, including 94 separate time entries by seven different timekeepers dedicated to an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.  Again, due to the prevalence of block billing, the court was unable to identify the precise number of hours spent on unsuccessful strategies.

Additionally, the defense counsel lacked support for the hourly rates charged.  The party that seeks to recover attorney fees has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of rates charged by the attorneys. The defense failed to provide relevant information about the experience and background of the timekeepers. In addition, the court identified overstaffing, as eight different timekeepers, attorneys, and paralegals viewed the same video surveillance multiple times. The court identified over 100 entries totaling 444.95 hours related to viewing the video surveillance.

Finally, the court analyzed the defense counsel’s use of a fee multiplier. The court looked at whether the multiplier was required to obtain competent counsel, whether the risk of non-payment was mitigated in another way and considered the amount involved, the results obtained, and fee arrangement between the attorney and client.  There is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar is sufficient to attract competent counsel, therefore the court found the use of a fee multiplier unreasonable.  Furthermore the defense counsel mitigated the risk of non-payment by charging high hourly rates and the fee awarded exceeded the agreed upon contingency fee amount of $815,538.35.

Implications for Legal Billing: The court’s application of the 20% reduction illustrates the effect of pervasive block billing.  When a court is unable to parse out the hours spent on a task, the court is more likely to significantly reduce the fee as a whole, instead of simply removing an impermissible charge from the fee.

This case also reinforces the importance of accurately staffing employees.  When an employee is overstaffed on a task or an employee is overqualified for a task, courts can use their discretion to reduce the award.

The attorney seeking to recover fees is responsible for providing evidence that establishes the reasonableness of the rate charged including information about the experience and background of the timekeepers.

Finally, fee multipliers will be scrutinized as the lodestar method of calculating legal fees is the preferred method.

* Hiscox Dedicated Corporate Member v. Matrix Group, 2012 WL 2226441 (M.D. Fla. 2012). Full copies of court decisions may be available through counsel or through various Internet links or paid services.

By Keith Langlais

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(Volume 2, Issue 31)

In a recent case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio made a $2,422.80 reduction in the $6,371 of fees requested by the plaintiff’s attorneys. The court reduced the requested amount after reviewing the bills and finding the hourly rate charged by the attorneys was not reasonable for the location in which services were rendered, and that the firm charged fees for work that was clerical in nature.

The court first determined what a reasonable hourly rate would be, by the “prevailing market rates in the local community.” The market in the case was Toledo, Ohio, and the firm charged rates from $225 to $425 per hour for attorney services, and from $60 to $165 per hour for paralegal services. The firm argued that their experience and prior awards justified the fees. The court utilized rates in line with the Ohio State Bar Association’s 2010 Economics of Law Practice Study, the work involved in the case, the attorney’s experience in the subject matter, and the necessity of rates in an FDCPA action that would garner competent counsel. As a result, the court found the fees charged were excessive and reduced the hourly rates of attorneys from $425 to $300 per hour, $300 to $200 per hour and $225 to $175 per hour. Paralegal fees were also reduced from $165 to $110 per hour.

Next, the court evaluated the type of work that was performed during the 22.4 hours billed. The court found that internal administrative tasks and that review of e-mails from the electronic court filing system were purely clerical work and did not justify compensation under the fee-shifting statute in the case.

Implications for Legal Billing: This decision highlights that attorneys must charge a reasonable fee in light of the locality in which they are billing. Whether a rate is “reasonable” is based on local standards of the community. An attorney’s past performance or awards are no indication of future results or fees that will be awarded.

The court’s decision also highlights that is unreasonable to charge mere clerical tasks as part of a client’s legal fee. And on a related note, the court also noted that document preparation must be performed within a reasonable amount of time in order to be reasonable.

Lastly, it is unusual that a court would be so deferential to block billing procedures. Block billing is ethically objectionable because it may lead to excessive charges and overbilling. What seemed to save the law firm in this case was that they charged in minimum units of time of one-tenth of an hour blocks. The court indicated that because this was done and there was a pattern to the sporadic block billing, it was permissible to do so.

* Jablonski v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, 2012 WL 1552462 (N.D. Ohio). Full copies of court decisions may be available through counsel or through various Internet links or paid services.

By Lisa Belrose

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(Volume 2, Issue 30)

In a recent District Court of Oregon case, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees arising directly from the plaintiff’s conduct. The court assessed the defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs, totaling $108,197, as a result of defendant’s successful sanctions motion against the plaintiff.  The court granted the defendant’s request in part, and denied it in part, reducing the request by approximately $33,000. In doing so, the court analyzed the percentage of recoverable hours attributed to the successful claims and the reasonable rates in the community.

Specifically, the defendant stated that the hours were expended as follows: (1) 111.7 hours related to discovery and review of plaintiff’s emails; (2) 208.1 hours related to the motion for sanctions; and (3) 79.6 hours relating to the taking of plaintiff’s deposition. The plaintiff challenged each set of hours on different grounds and the court discussed each one in part.

For example, the defendant requested 79.6 hours relating to the plaintiff’s deposition because it did not believe it was “feasible to identify a percentage of the disposition attributable to plaintiff’s misconduct.” In contrast, the plaintiff argued that only 59 pages (7.8% of the total) of the 756-page deposition relate to his misconduct, and as such the defendant should only be awarded 7.8% of 79.6 hours requested. The court noted that as the fee applicant, the defendant “bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended in litigation and must submit evidence in support of those hours worked” – a burden the defendant did not meet.

Next, the plaintiff asked the court to reduce, by one-half, the defendant’s travel time because that travel would have been made regardless of the sanctions imposed. The court was inclined to agree, and disallowed 16.6 hours for preparing for an unsuccessful summary judgment motion and reduced related travel time by one-half.

Then the court turned to the reasonableness of the hourly rate set by the defendant’s attorneys and supporting staff in light of prevailing market rates in the relevant community.  The test for a reasonable hourly rate is determined by looking at the prevailing rate in the relevant community for similar work performed by attorneys with similar experience. The court found that the requested hourly rates of $384 and $336 for the two senior partners were reasonable but reduced the hourly rates for one junior associate and one paralegal.

Finally, the court determined in light of all adjustments and reductions that the defendant should be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $74,964.50 as opposed to the $108,197 originally requested.

Implications for Legal Billing: The analysis of requested attorneys’ fees in this case demonstrates that billing for work unrelated to the issue at hand will generally be disallowed. This is even true in situations where the attorney feels the work cannot be adequately apportioned from other work. Here, the court explained it has a general duty to apportion fees, absent a situation where the claims are so intertwined that separation would be useless.

The court also discussed how reasonable hourly rates should be calculated and what evidence is necessary to show that a reasonable rate has been set. The standard is based on prevailing rates by attorneys in that area displaying similar experience. If the standard is not met, the court will not hesitate to adjust rates accordingly.

* U.S. ex rel. Berglund v. Boeing Co., 2012 WL 1902599 (D. Or. 2012). Full copies of court decisions may be available through counsel or through various Internet links or paid services.

By Derek R. Garman

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(Volume 2, Issue 29)

A New York trial court adopted Sterling Analytics’ expert opinion that a title insurer’s obligation to pay for the defense of a title action was not worth more than $600,000 in fees claimed by petitioner, but only $38,840 in “reasonable” fees. The action involved the defense of a dispute between a homeowner and the Village of Scarsdale concerning a strip of land adjoining the residence. The insurer had disclaimed coverage, but the court later found that a defense was required, resulting in a fee submission by the defense attorney to the title insurer for several years of defense work.

The defense attorney contended that she had accumulated over $600,000 in time charges, but that she had “lost” all of her time entries due to a computer malfunction. She also claimed that much of her time was reasonably expended not only in the defense of the action, but also in bringing complaints against the trial judge and the court reporter, as well as attempting to convince local politicians that her cause was just. She had also claimed a right to reimbursement for time spent attempting to convince Chicago Title to cover the defense.

In the absence of any time records, Sterling Analytics reviewed thousands of pages, comprising the actual work product in the case, assigning reasonable value to every document and every transaction.  In addition, the Sterling Analytics’ report excluded time for activity not pertinent to the defense, such as the time expended for pursuit of the disciplinary actions against the judge and the court reporter, as well as for pursuit of insurance coverage.

At the close of a two-day bench trial, the court, ruling from the bench, adopted Sterling Analytics’ analysis that only $38,840 in time was reasonably incurred.

By David Paige

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(Volume 2, Issue 28)

Last month, a federal court drastically reduced a requested fee award of $11,325 to a mere $1,940 after the prevailing Plaintiff failed to provided sufficient detailed documentation supporting their petition, among other findings. Costs in the action were also reduced from a requested $2,658.24 to $363.24 for similar reasons.

First, the Court reviewed the proposed hourly rates and total hours to determine a reasonable starting lodestar amount. The Plaintiff’s fee request was based on 5.18 hours of work by the lead attorney at a rate of $450/hour, 24 hours of work by an unnamed independent research attorney at $300/hour, 8.6 hours of work performed by a paralegal at a rate of $150/hour, and 6.72 hours of work performed by an administrative assistant at a rate of $75/hour. The court noted that although the legal standard dictated that the party requesting the fee award must demonstrate the reasonableness of their rate based on the “prevailing market rates for representation in this type of action” in the relevant community, counsel had entirely omitted any evidence to show his rate was reasonable.  In addition, there was no evidence in the reply brief to justify the $300 rate of the unnamed research attorney. To address these deficiencies, the court relied on the fee schedule established by Community Legal Services of Philadelphia to determine that $350 was a more reasonable rate in the same community for the lead attorney, and disallowed all 24 hours charged by the research attorney.

The defense had similarly objected to Plaintiff’s request for the purely administrative hours charged. Again, the court noted that in certain circumstances recovery of separate fees for non-legal work was allowed where the requesting party showed evidence of customary practice in the same community. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff had also failed to support the petition for administrative task charges with sufficient evidence in their reply to the defense’s fee objection.

The court then turned to specific itemized charges to determine whether reasonable time was expended. The court found several seemingly boilerplate filings that did “not warrant the hours attributed to them.”

In turning to costs, the Court found that Plaintiff’s request for $475 for “investigative expenses”, $560 for “service of process” and $1260 in “Appearance Attorney’s Fees” were all insufficiently documented and supported by any explanation. Plaintiffs were only entitled to an award of the $350 filing fee and $13.24 in courier charges.

Implications for Legal Billing: This decision emphasizes the importance of providing sufficient documentation to support a request for fees. The information that a court may consider important when making a determination as to reasonableness of fees can include evidence of hourly rates customary in the relevant community for similar levels of experience and case difficulty. Likewise, a party petitioning the court for separate charges for an administrative assistance may be requested to provide evidence of precedent for courts within the same or similar jurisdictions awarding similar charges. Detailed documentation to support itemized costs may also be requested by the court to make a fair determination.

In addition, firms should be aware of charging excessive hours for seemingly boilerplate work. Where a court finds that a similar work product was used by the same firm in other cases of the same nature, they may reduce the number of hours charged if deemed unreasonable. The decision in this case also reaffirms that secretarial work charged at a high attorney billing rate will often be reduced to the extent appropriate to compensate for legal work alone.

* J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. TCOS Enterprises, Inc., 2012 WL 1361655 (E.D. Pa. 2012). Full copies of court decisions may be available through counsel or through various Internet links or paid services.

By Erin L. Sussman

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(Volume 2, Issue 27)

In a recent decision from the U.S. District Court of Maine, the Court reviewed Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses following a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor under Maine’s Clean Election Act. The end result was a reduction of close to $40,000 in attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded to Plaintiffs.

The Court found that time spent on unsuccessful motions should be excluded from the fee award, finding those hours to be severable from the Plaintiffs’ successful efforts. The Court eliminated 50% of the hours billed by the lead firm and local counsel related to unsuccessful motions.

Next, the Court held that hours billed for the search for local counsel and for potential plaintiffs must be excluded from the fee award. The Court also deducted time spent on media relations, noting that “federal cases are unanimous in denying awards for attorneys’ fees for media related time.” The Court then found that time billed for experts and discovery was “excessive and unnecessary,” and deducted time billed for those activities.

The Court then reduced the $250 hourly rate for three attorneys from the lead firm with four to six years experience to $175 per hour, the prevailing rate in Maine for attorneys with comparable experience. The Court also reduced the hourly rate for time spent preparing the Fee Motion to $150 per hour.

Finally, the Court reduced the award for costs associated with legal research and pro hac vice admission fees. The Court only allowed reimbursement for the pro hac vice admission of one attorney from the lead firm. The Court also reduced costs billed for legal research related to the unsuccessful motions by 50%.

After a careful review of the billing records, the Court awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees totaling $30,073.50 and costs of $3,376.32, for a grand total of $33, 449.82, approximately 45.7% of the originally requested award of $73,190.59.

Implications for Legal Billing: The Court reiterated its authority here to exclude time spent on unsuccessful claims and unproductive hours. This includes time spent on legal research related to unsuccessful motions, as well as redundant and unnecessary use of experts and discovery.

The Court also reaffirmed that time spent on media relations and time spent in search for local counsel and potential plaintiffs is not reimbursable.

Finally, this decision reaffirms the Court’s authority to reduce hourly rates for Fee Motions and to reduce attorneys’ hourly rates that exceed the prevailing market standard.

* Cushing III v. McKee, 2012 WL 1119237 (D. Me. 2012). Full copies of court decisions may be available through counsel or through various Internet links or paid services.

By Molly Fitzpatrick

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(Volume 2, Issue 26)

The Hawaii District Court denied a fee request under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act (CRAFAA) after landlords prevailed in challenging the constitutionality of a Hawaii Law requiring appraisers to determine fair and reasonable rent in existing leases. Although the District Court denied the fee request as a matter of law, in adopting the Findings & Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the court made a point of calling out numerous deficiencies with the $1.5 million request that would result in “substantial reductions” had plaintiffs been entitled to an award.

First, the court took issue with the “grossly excessive and highly unreasonable” hourly rates. The court considered the rates requested by the Washington, D.C. firm of Skadden Arps compared to the prevailing market rates in the community. For example, the Skadden attorneys charged an hourly rate of $400 for a junior associate and $900 for a senior partner, whereas attorneys of comparable experience in Hawaii would charge $160 and $350, respectively. The court also noted that while time billed by paralegals is recoverable, time billed by other “professionals” such as librarians, litigation specialists, litigation coordinators, or legal assistants is non-compensable.

Next, the court called attention to the significant number of time entries billed in block format. The court noted that counsel’s use of block billing made it difficult, if not impossible for the court to ascertain the reasonableness of the hours expended with respect to specific time entries. Accordingly, the magistrate Judge recommended an across the board reduction of 15-25% with respect to block billed entries.

The Court also noted that plaintiffs sought to recover fees for tasks, travel, and other activities for which multiple attorneys billed. The court stated that duplicative time spent by multiple attorneys is non-compensable, and that the general rule is that two professionals cannot bill for attending the same meeting. The court stated, to the extent multiple attorneys or paralegals worked on any given task, the Court would carefully scrutinize the entries and deduct any duplicative and excessive time that resulted from the involvement of multiple individuals.

Furthermore, the court found that time spent reviewing Court-generated notices, notifying clients of court hearings, filing documents with the Court, communication with court staff, scheduling, and corresponding regarding deadlines, are clerical in nature and not compensable.

The court also stated that it would have denied plaintiff’s request to recover expenses. Although the court permits reimbursement for electronic research costs, the plaintiffs failed to submit any receipts or invoices in support, even after requested. As such, the court determined that the request would have been denied. Similarly, although travel expenses are recoverable under the CRAFAA, the court found the plaintiff’s first class airfare and luxury accommodations unreasonable. Absent proof of some illness, disability, or other condition, discomfort alone is an insufficient basis for the exorbitant request. The court noted that while plaintiffs may agree to certain expenses, it does not follow that such expenses are necessarily recoverable.

Implications for Legal Billing: This case serves as a reminder that counsel should have a thorough understanding of the laws which grant entitlement to attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs in this case sought fees, without distinguishing between prevailing parties and innocent parties, as required by the controlling statute. As a result, the court found they were entitled to no recovery at all.

Despite this finding, the court spoke at length about flaws within the plaintiffs’ fee request and improper billing practices. This reaction by the court reaffirms the increasing level of scrutiny courts will apply to fee requests, and their seeming frustration with seeing repeated improper billing practices. As always, unreasonable block billing and excessive or duplicative billing entries will be reduced by the court. Notably, the court in this case also narrowly defined compensable “professionals” as either attorneys or paralegals. Any other support professionals, such as litigation coordinators, may not charge hourly rates.

Finally, it is worth remembering that while parties may agree to cover certain fees and expenses, such costs may not be reasonable or necessary, or recoverable as a matter of law. The onus then, is on the parties to make sure they have a reasonable fee agreement in place, or risk being stuck with a massive bill at the end of the day.

* HRPT Properties Trust v. Lingle, 775 F. Supp.2d 1225 (D. Haw. 2011). Full copies of court decisions may be available through counsel or through various Internet links or paid services.

By Dan Engoren